Trade Dependency, Bargaining and External Debt

This paper analyzes the factors determining the payment on outstanding debt in the presence of partial defaults, and the feasibility of renewed investment. We show that a higher relative size of sectors with lower substitutability between domestic and foreign products will increase the resource transfer ceiling. Even with a partial default, investment in highly trade dependent sectors with high productivity may be warranted. This investment can be implemented by a marginal relief of the present debt service, in exchange for investment in the proper sector. A way to partially overcome some of the monitoring problems associated with renewed investment is through direct investment.
Publication date: October 1988
ISBN: 9781451951820
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Topics covered in this book

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Economics- Macroeconomics , Economics / General , International - Economics , bargaining , dependency , intermediate products , external finance , bargaining power

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